Plucknett, T. F. T. , 'Impeachment and Attainder', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 3 (1953), 145-58

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Quick Summary

King Richard II faced difficulties finding suitable legal procedures to bring down his enemies in 1397

  • Richard II experimented with legal procedures to destroy his enemies in 1397
  • The king and his opponents struggled for exclusive control of impeachment
  • It was paradoxical that the king should rely on impeachment to destroy his enemies
Key Conclusion

Plucknett explores the development of impeachment – a legal procedure whereby individuals are brought to trial in parliament. Impeachment was ‘the most powerful weapon in the political armoury, short of civil war’ (p. 145). Plucknett concludes that in 1397 when Richard II took revenge on the lords who had rebelled against him in 1388, he had to contend with the problem of finding a suitable legal procedure to bring his enemies to trial. There was no ‘direct royal procedure available to the king to initiate the trial for treason of peers and ministers’ (p. 154), and so the crown had to experiment with the procedure of impeachment.

Content Overview

Plucknett explores the legal procedure of impeachment between the Good Parliament in 1376 and Richard’s revenge against his enemies in 1397. During this period, Plucknett discerns a ‘struggle for the right to the exclusive control’ of impeachment (p. 145). In the Wonderful Parliament of 1386, the king’s political opponents used impeachment to bring down ministers and advisors protected by the king. These endeavours suffered a setback when Richard II asked a group of judges to assess action taken against him during the parliament, and they asserted that impeachment without the king’s consent was illegal. Impeachment was a legal weapon typically used by the baronial opposition, but Richard turned to the procedure in 1397 to crush his enemies.

Further Findings

Plucknett highlights the paradox of the king relying on the ‘indirect’ method of impeachment to destroy his enemies when he was ‘completely master of the whole machinery of state’ (p. 154). The principle that ‘the king’s personal record of a man’s guilt was sufficient to work an instant conviction’ (p. 154), which had been used by Edward II, was no longer accepted. Instead of directly moving against his enemies, the king had to organise a group of lords to initiate a trial of treason against them, or alternatively inspire the commons to initiate impeachment proceedings.

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