Phillpotts, Christopher, 'The fate of the truce of Paris, 1396-1415', Journal of Medieval History 24 (1998), 61-80

-

Quick Summary

The Truce of Paris (1396) formed a framework to reduce the level of warfare between England and France up until 1415

  • The focus of the truce changed depending on the particular ambitions of subsequent English kings
  • Richard II maintained the truce after 1397 to secure dowry payments from France
  • Henry IV and Charles VI put their differences aside to establish a peace between kingdoms
Key Conclusion

Phillpotts explores the longest truce of the Hundred Years War, agreed at Paris between Richard II of England and Charles VI of France in 1396, and its subsequent extension, redefinition and clarification until 1415. Truces reduced the level of warfare, rather than ended it, and needed to be periodically renegotiated to be effective. Phillpotts concludes that the truce of 1396 ‘formed the central framework of a series of general and particular truces’. The focus of the truce changed between 1396 and 1314, from Richard II’s initial concern to preserve his position in the duchy of Guyenne, to Henry IV’s preoccupation with defending his usurped throne, and then Henry V’s determination to obtain his family’s rights in France’ (p. 79).

Content Overview

Phillpotts explores Richard II’s intentions in agreeing to the truce in 1396. Rather than seeking lasting peace, Richard’s ‘attitude towards the conflict with France was altogether more belligerent’ (p. 62). When no further concessions were expected from the French in 1397, the primary reason Richard II maintained the truce was to secure the dowry payments following his marriage to Isabelle, daughter of the French king. Subsequently, Richard did not seek closer cooperation but actively sought to halt the advance of the Valois (French royal dynasty) influence in western Europe (p. 66). For example, in 1396-8, he tried to halt French advances into the Low Countries by using English funds to construct a defensive wall along the Rhine.

Further Findings

Richard’s deposition in 1399 threw the truce of 1396 into doubt. Charles VI was not prepared to accept Henry IV’s legitimacy as king but faced financial and political problems at home and was unprepared to resume full-scale war. Phillpotts observes that ‘the commitment of Charles and his family to a personal vendetta against Henry was not equivalent to a public war between the kingdoms of England and France’ (p. 72). Indeed, when Henry IV obtained confirmation of the Paris truce in 1400, ‘the principle was established that a truce was made not between two princes, but between the kingdoms… England and France were at truce even though neither of their kings recognised the other’ (p. 80).

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Theilmann, John M., 'Stubbs, Shakespeare, and Recent Historians of Richard II', Albion 8 (1976), 107-124

-
Quick Summary The idea that Richard II was a tyrant persists even though a satisfactory history of his reign is yet to be written According to the Stubbsean Orthodoxy, Richard II was a coldly calculating king A revision to the Stubbsean Orthodoxy cast Richard II as insane Existing research distorts history by its fixation on constitutional issues Key Conclusion Theilmann explores the historiography of Richard II’s reign from the 1890s to the 1970s and, in particular, the verdict reached by historians about his approach to kingship. This historiographical review leads Theilmann to conclude that the traditional interpretation of Richard’s reign – the ‘Stubbsean Orthodoxy’ – has been slowly challenged but its influence remains strong. According to this Orthodoxy, Richard II was a ‘coldly calculating king’ (p. 110). He was a tyrant determined to diminish parliament and destroy constitutional government. Theilmann notes that while more recent research has m
Read more

Waugh, W. T., 'The Great Statute of Praemunire', The English Historical Review 37 (1922), 173-205

-
Quick Summary The Statute of Praemunire (1393) was a ‘political manifesto’ designed to warn the pope not to meddle with the English legal system Historians have been uncertain about what the statute was supposed to achieve The statute was issued after complaints from the commons in parliament about the pope In its application, the statute had very little legal significance Key Conclusion Waugh re-examines the Statute of  Praemunire  (1393) in light of the ‘perplexing variety of opinions’ among historians about what the statute was designed to achieve (p. 173). Referred to as the ‘most anti-papal Act of Parliament passed prior to the reign of Henry VIII’ by some historians, others have denied it served any anti-papal purpose at all. Waugh concludes that the statute was intended primarily to impress upon the pope the ‘unanimity of the English nation’ in opposition to his recent moves to challenge an aspect of the judicial system in England. As such, Waug
Read more