Palmer, J. J. N., 'England and the Great Western Schism, 1388-1399', The English Historical Review 83 (1968), 516-522

-

Quick Summary

Richard II and his government are not to blame for the failure to resolve the Great Western Schism in the last decades of the fourteenth century

  • Richard II wanted a peaceful resolution to the schism
  • Lasting peace with France was Richard’s primary objective
  • Richard’s approach to the schism can no longer be characterised by ‘instability’
Key Conclusion

Palmer challenges the idea that English policy was primarily to blame for the failure to bring an end to the Great Western Schism at the end of the fourteenth century. Palmer concludes that Richard II and his council consistently favoured a peaceful resolution to the schism between 1388 and 1399. In reaching this conclusion, Palmer argues against the interpretation of Edouard Perroy, who argued in his L’Angleterre et le grand Schisme d’Occident (Paris, 1933) that England refused to ‘contemplate any solution to the schism other than universal recognition of the ‘legitimate’ pope’ (p. 516).

Content Overview

One of the documents examined by Palmer is an undated letter from King Richard II to the king of Navarre, in which Richard welcomed a proposal to send delegates to a conference in Bayonne to seek a resolution to the schism. Palmer argues that the letter was written at the end of 1388, predating the French king’s commitment to resolving the schism which was evident only by the spring of 1391 (p. 517). The English did not put recognition of the ‘legitimate’ pope ahead of achieving a lasting peace with France, which Palmer argues was Richard II and his council’s primary objective.

Further Findings

English policy can now be seen as ‘far more realistic from every angle’ (p. 522). Indeed, the consistency of the English approach to the schism forces us to reconsider our assessment of King Richard II’s abilities as a politician. The negative assessment of the king’s approach to the schism – characterised by a ‘supposed instability and infirmness of purpose’ – is no longer sustainable. Richard II did not change the policy of his government on a whim in 1396 to favour resolution of the schism, rather this had been his objective since 1388 (p. 522).

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Theilmann, John M., 'Stubbs, Shakespeare, and Recent Historians of Richard II', Albion 8 (1976), 107-124

-
Quick Summary The idea that Richard II was a tyrant persists even though a satisfactory history of his reign is yet to be written According to the Stubbsean Orthodoxy, Richard II was a coldly calculating king A revision to the Stubbsean Orthodoxy cast Richard II as insane Existing research distorts history by its fixation on constitutional issues Key Conclusion Theilmann explores the historiography of Richard II’s reign from the 1890s to the 1970s and, in particular, the verdict reached by historians about his approach to kingship. This historiographical review leads Theilmann to conclude that the traditional interpretation of Richard’s reign – the ‘Stubbsean Orthodoxy’ – has been slowly challenged but its influence remains strong. According to this Orthodoxy, Richard II was a ‘coldly calculating king’ (p. 110). He was a tyrant determined to diminish parliament and destroy constitutional government. Theilmann notes that while more recent research h...
Read more

Phillpotts, Christopher, 'The fate of the truce of Paris, 1396-1415', Journal of Medieval History 24 (1998), 61-80

-
Quick Summary The Truce of Paris (1396) formed a framework to reduce the level of warfare between England and France up until 1415 The focus of the truce changed depending on the particular ambitions of subsequent English kings Richard II maintained the truce after 1397 to secure dowry payments from France Henry IV and Charles VI put their differences aside to establish a peace between kingdoms Key Conclusion Phillpotts explores the longest truce of the Hundred Years War, agreed at Paris between Richard II of England and Charles VI of France in 1396, and its subsequent extension, redefinition and clarification until 1415. Truces reduced the level of warfare, rather than ended it, and needed to be periodically renegotiated to be effective. Phillpotts concludes that the truce of 1396 ‘formed the central framework of a series of general and particular truces’. The focus of the truce changed between 1396 and 1314, from Richard II’s initial concern to p...
Read more

Wilkinson, B., 'The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381', Speculum 15 (1940), 12-35

-
Quick Summary The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 was primarily a ‘movement of reaction’ against John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster Historians have paid too much attention to one particular source Common hatred of John of Gaunt brought the Londoners and the rebels together After the destruction of Gaunt’s palace in London the Peasants’ Revolt began to wane Key Conclusion Wilkinson provides a revisionist interpretation of the events in London during the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381. Wilkinson contends that historians have paid too much attention to one particular source – the return of the jurors in the Sheriffs’ Inquisitions of 1382. The evidence presented to the Sheriffs’ Inquisitions was ‘thoroughly and, it seems likely, intentionally misleading’ (p. 12), since the London jurors ‘did their best to conceal the powerful support which Londoners themselves gave to the revolt’ (p. 29). Wilkinson concludes that the revolt was primarily a ‘movement of reaction against J...
Read more