Lydon, J. F., 'Richard II’s Expeditions to Ireland', The Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland 93 (1963)
Quick Summary
In 1394 Richard II led a successful military campaign against Irish
rebels who threatened the existence of the English colony in Ireland
- By the 1390s Richard
II was forced to act if he wanted to retain his lordship over Ireland
- Richard landed in Ireland at
the head of the largest army ever to land there in the middle ages
- Richard showed himself to be
a good soldier and strategist
Key Conclusion
Lydon explores the success of Richard II’s military expedition to
Ireland in 1394. Lydon concludes that the presence of a large English army
was the only way that Richard could solve the problem of rebellion facing the
English colony in Ireland. The greatest single threat facing the English colony
was posed by Art MacMurrough Kavanagh, king of Leinster. Even at the beginning
of the fourteenth century the Leinster Irish had been strong enough to threaten
the English stronghold at Dublin but by the 1390s the situation was critical.
Richard was forced to act if he wished to retain his lordship over Ireland.
MacMurrough was compelled to surrender, and Richard succeeded in stabilizing
his lordship.
Content Overview
Richard landed at Waterford on 2 October at the head of the largest army
ever to land in Ireland during the middle ages – Lydon calculates that the army
numbered more than 5,000 men. The English strategy involved establishing a ring
of garrisons to pin down the Irish, an embargo on imports from the colony of
Leinster, a naval blockade, and large troop deployments of light cavalry.
Success in war allowed Richard to implement a programme of reform. This
included a complete pardon of those Irish rebels willing to submit, the
confirmation of the Gaelic leaders in the lands they had held since the
conquest, and the creation of new English land in Leinster.
Further Findings
Richard showed himself a good soldier with a ‘remarkable grasp of the
difficulties of fighting in Ireland’. Moreover, his success made it clear that
any policy of conciliation with the Irish rebels without significant military
backing was ‘more than a hundred years of date’ (p. 148). The time had passed
when the Gaelic leaders could be won over by ‘persuasion’: the only options
left were withdrawal or conquest. Richard demonstrated that conquest was not an
impractical suggestion, but his successors preferred withdrawal and created the
Pale – a fortified area around Dublin. By 1399 the situation had deteriorated
and Richard led another expedition to Ireland, but this was cut short by the
rebellion in England that would lead to his deposition.
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