Fletcher, C. D., 'Narrative and political strategies at the deposition of Richard II', Journal of Medieval History 30 (2004), 323-341

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Quick Summary

Richard II did not confiscate the duchy of Lancaster from Henry Bolingbroke in 1399, and Bolingbroke’s rebellion against the king was nothing less than treason

  • Richard II left open the possibility that Bolingbroke could claim his inheritance
  • Chroniclers believed that Richard II brought about his own demise when he confiscated the duchy of Lancaster
  • Bolingbroke made a very poor case for the deposition of Richard II
Key Conclusion

Fletcher explores how Henry Bolingbroke gained support for his bid to depose Richard II by drawing upon a widespread belief in the injustice of Richard’s decision to confiscate his inheritance – the duchy of Lancaster. Fletcher concludes, contrary to the prevailing view of historians, that Richard II never actually confiscated the duchy of Lancaster following the death of John of Gaunt on 3 February 1399. Rather, Richard II left open the possibility that Bolingbroke could return from exile after serving his ten year sentence, and receive ‘livery of seisin’ (i.e. the legal process for the transfer of property, p. 329).

Content Overview

Henry Bolingbroke’s claims about disinheritance struck a chord with the ‘informal political ideas’ found in contemporary literary texts known as romances, wherein disinheritance was a recurring theme used to put ‘the hero in the right’ (p. 329). Indeed, his rebellion against Richard II is explained and justified by many chroniclers ‘by a single act of illegality through which the king brought about his own demise’, namely, his confiscation of the duchy of Lancaster (p. 326). These chroniclers wrongly assumed that Bolingbroke was justified in using force against the king because he had suffered disinheritance and was denied justice. In fact, according to medieval law, ‘what he [Bolingbroke] did was, in law, nothing less than treason’ (p. 328).

Further Findings

According to Fletcher, Henry Bolingbroke’s case for the deposition of Richard II, which is recorded in a series of articles known as the Record and Process, make ‘a very poor argument for his removal’. Moreover, Fletcher argues that the case made by Bolingbroke ‘in no way exculpated Henry of Lancaster and his supporters from the crime of having overthrown an anointed king’ (p. 326). Indeed, the articles of deposition do not even make the claim that Bolingbroke was disinherited, because ‘in the letter of the law, this simply did not happen’ (p. 337). Fletcher suggest that the ‘informal political ideas’ about disinheritance found in medieval romances are perhaps ‘more powerful and emotive than formal explanations’ for the deposition (p. 324).

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